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ABSTRACT
The demand for air transportation is anticipated to continue to grow in the future. In order to
accommodate future demands, the U.S. Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO)
proposed the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). One of the NextGen
technologies currently under development is Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast
(ADS-B), which is a new satellite-based surveillance technology.
In order to achieve the adoption of ADS-B, equipage by aircraft operators is essential.
However, it is sometimes difficult to achieve the transition from a current technology to a new
technology. Therefore, encouraging the individual user's adoption is a key factor of the
successful technology transition.
This thesis develops the system dynamics model to represent how individual users adopt a new
technology, and analyzes how the adoption of new technologies can be encouraged using the
system dynamics model. The effects of the following four incentive policies are examined: (1)
Acceleration of operational benefits, (2) Preferred access, (3) Financial incentive, and (4)
Mandate equipage.
The result of the policy analysis shows the each incentive policy is effective to encourage the
early adoption of ADS-B. Especially, achieving early benefits is important to accelerate
equipage. Moving forward the mandate date of ADS-B equipage also can be effective to
increase total benefits.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The demand for air transportation has been increased and is anticipated to continue to grow
in the future. According to the forecast by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), air
transport passengers in the U.S. are projected to double by 2025. It is believed that the
current air transportation system cannot accommodate future demands. In response to the
future increased demand, the U.S. Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) proposes
the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen), which includes a set of new
technologies to increase capacity as well as to enhance safety and security. The
implementation of NextGen has already begun. One of the NextGen technologies currently
under development is Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B), which is a new
satellite-based surveillance technology (Joint Planning and Development Office, 2007).
Technology transitions are essential to solve complex problems in many cases. However, it is
sometimes difficult to achieve a smooth transition from a current technology to a new
technology. Some technologies require individual user's adoption to achieve the technology
transition. Even though a new technology is developed, if individual users do not adopt it, the
benefit of the technology cannot be achieved. Therefore, encouraging the individual user's
adoption is a key factor of the successful technology transition.
This thesis develops the model for how individual users adopt a new technology and analyzes
how the adoption of the new technology can be encouraged. The motivation of this thesis is
to contribute to the FAA's policy making to achieve the successful adoption of ADS-B.
1.2 Problem Statement
This thesis analyzes the effect of incentive policies for encouraging user adoption. There are
several approaches for this encouragement. The effects of the following four policies on
equipage are examined in this thesis: (1) Acceleration of Operational Benefits, (2) Preferred
Access, (3) Financial Incentives, and (4) Mandate Equipage.
1.2.1 Acceleration of Operational Benefits
The first policy to be analyzed is to accelerate operational benefits, which can be derived
from applications of a new technology. The operational benefit can be increased by
developing new applications or accelerating the implementation of applications. For example,
the operational benefit of car navigation systems increased when the new application
providing real-time traffic information to drivers was developed (Sugawara, 2007).
1.2.2 Preferred Access
The second policy is to provide preferred access to adopters of new technologies. Only users
who adopt the technology can access additional capacity, new services, and so on. The
benefit from preferred access decreases as adopters increase. When the number of adopters is
small, they can receive a large benefit from preferred access. However, when many users
adopt the technology, the benefit of preferred access should be shared and the benefit per user
decreases. When all users adopt it, the benefit of the preferred access becomes zero.
Therefore, preferred access can be an incentive for early adoption. An example of preferred
access is that aircraft equipped with the equipment for the area Navigation (RNAV) can have
priority access to Haneda airport in Tokyo, Japan during night time (Japanese Ministry of
Land, Infrastructure and Transport, 2005).
1.2.3 Financial Incentive
The third policy is financial incentive. When financial incentive is given only to early
adopters, it can be an incentive for early adoption. While users can receive the operational
benefit and the benefit from preferred access every year after adoption, the financial
incentive can usually be received only once. Therefore, the financial incentive has the same
effect as reducing initial cost of adoption.
1.2.4 Mandate Equipage
The last policy to increase adopters of new technologies is mandate equipage, which is
usually required after a certain preparation period. When the mandate date is moved forward,
the benefit of the new technology increases because adoption can be achieved early. On the
other hand, the cost that users pay also increases. Therefore, this thesis analyzes the optimal
timing of mandate equipage.
1.3 Methodology
The methodology that is used for policy analysis in this thesis is a system dynamics modeling,
which can be used to analyze the dynamic change of many factors that relate with each other
in the complex system.
First, to understand how individual users adopt new technologies, the system dynamics
model of the adoption of a new technology is developed. Then, to analyze the effect of each
incentive policy described in section 1.2, each incentive is added to the model and the change
of adoption behavior is observed.
Chapter 2 Technology Transition
A lot of technologies have been developed to solve various challenges that current society
faces. While some technologies have been adopted successfully, some technologies have
failed to be adopted even though the technology itself was innovative and valuable. This
chapter describes the barriers to technology transition and the incentives for encouraging it.
2.1 Barriers to Technology Transition
There are several barriers to achieving a successful technology transition. The first is the
mismatch of the distribution of costs and benefits among stakeholders. Figure 2-1 shows the
framework for analysis of cost-benefit distribution (Marais and Weigel, 2006). When the
stakeholder who receives benefits and the stakeholder who bears costs are the same, it is easy
to achieve a transition as long as the benefits are larger than the costs. However, when the
stakeholder who can receive benefits is different from the stakeholder who bears costs, it is
difficult to incentivize the adoption. For example, in Figure 2-1, while the first stakeholder
(stk1) can receive benefits without paying any costs, the nth stakeholder (stkn) cannot receive
any benefits in spite of paying costs. There is, therefore, no incentive for stkn to pay the costs.
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Figure 2-1: Cost-Benefit Distribution across Stakeholders (Marais and Weigel, 2006)
Even within the same stakeholder group, a problem of a group behavior paradox may occur
(Olson, 1984). When members of a stakeholder group are large and the benefit should be
shared, the incentive to pay a cost is limited. When one member in a group pays a cost and a
benefit becomes available, the member who bears the cost can receive only small part of the
benefit. On the other hand, other members in the same stakeholder group can receive the
benefit without paying any costs. This is a free-rider problem. As the size of group increases,
the incentive to pay costs decreases.
The second barrier is a time lag between costs and benefits. Investors prefer immediate
benefits. However, the benefit sometimes becomes available only in the future. The present
value of future benefits is less than immediate benefits because of the time value of money.
The third barrier is an uncertainty of future benefits. When the future benefit is uncertain, the
value of the future benefit is reduced. Figure 2-2 shows this uncertainty (Mozdzanowska et
al., 2007). There are two types of uncertainty. One is the uncertainty of the level of the future
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Figure 2-2: Uncertainty of Future Benefits (Mozdzanowska et al., 2007)
2.2 Incentives for Technology Transition
In order to encourage early adoption of new technologies, there are several policy options of
incentives for equipage. According to Marais and Weigel, there are four general approaches
to encourage adoption of a new technology: (1) Infrastructure and Development Support, (2)
Technology value, (3) Positive incentives, and (4) Mandates and punitive measures (Marais
and Weigel, 2006).
First, ground infrastructure should be deployed to achieve the benefit of new technologies
such as ADS-B. In order to encourage the adoption, the government has to convince users
that the benefit of a new technology will be available. When the implementation schedule of
ground infrastructure is unclear, the value of the future benefit is reduced because of the
uncertainty. Therefore, the government has to show a clear schedule of implementation.
The second approach is to increase the value of a technology itself, which is derived from the
development of applications. For example, the technology value of ADS-B is the operational
benefit from applications. The FAA may increase the technology value by accelerating the
development of applications or developing new applications.
Thirdly, when the technology value itself is not enough to encourage adoption, positive
incentives may be used. In this thesis, two types of positive incentives are examined. The
first is to give preferred access. The other is to give financial incentive.
The last approach increasing adoption is mandate, which is an effective way to increase
adopters. However, when mandate is introduced rapidly without consensus of stakeholders,
strong resistance may be raised. In addition, when the mandate requires hurried adoption, the
total cost of adoption may increase.
Chapter 3 Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast
3.1 ADS-B System
ADS-B is a new surveillance technology for the Next Generation Air Transportation System
(NextGen). Figure 3-1 shows the ADS-B system architecture. The system is composed of
satellite positioning services, aircraft avionics and ground infrastructure. The equipped
aircraft broadcasts the position information automatically. Aircraft use the position
information from a satellite positioning service, such as Global Positioning System (GPS).
This position information is transmitted to ground infrastructure (air-to-ground data link) and
other equipped aircraft (air-to-air data link). This capability is called ADS-B Out. The
information received by ground infrastructure is transmitted to air traffic control (ATC)
facilities to be used for air traffic surveillance. The equipped aircraft that receive the
information from other aircraft or ATC can display the data on a display unit such as Cockpit
Display of Traffic Information (CDTI). This capability is called ADS-B In.
Figure 3-1: ADS-B System Architecture
ADS-B is "automatic" because aircraft transmit position information without any external
interrogations unlike TCAS and SSR, which send data in response to interrogations. ADS-B
is "dependent" because it relies on position sources and onboard transmission system. The
accuracy of the ADS-B system depends on the satellite position sources.
3.2 Current Surveillance Technology
Current surveillance service in the National Airspace System (NAS) is based on the radar
information. The radar system consists of primary and secondary surveillance radars. The
primary surveillance radar (PSR) recognizes the position of aircraft by receiving the radio
wave reflected from the surface of aircraft. PSR requires no special equipment aboard the
aircraft. PSR sometimes cannot distinguish aircraft because it receives the reflected wave
from objects other than aircraft, for example birds, mountains, clouds, and so on. PSR
calculates the distance by measuring the time from sending wave to receiving reflected wave.
A secondary surveillance radar (SSR) transmits interrogation pulse to aircraft. When a
transponder aboard the aircraft receives interrogation, it replies the aircraft information.
Therefore, aircraft must be equipped with transponder so that SSR system works. Unlike
PSR, SSR can identify aircraft because transponder on board aircraft sends the unique code
assigned to aircraft.
There are some gaps of radar coverage of the continental U.S. at low altitude. The reasons of
the gaps of radar coverage is the geographically restriction, such as mountain area, or
cost-effective manner, such as remote area. Outside radar coverage, the separation between
aircraft should be large.
3.3 ADS-B History
There have been some trials of ADS-B technology in the U.S. One of the trails was
conducted at UPS's hub airport in Louisville, KY. The FAA and UPS have been working
together to develop ADS-B for a decade. The ADS-B operation at Louisville airport was
approved by the FAA in January 2008. This is the first satellite-guided merging and spacing
during approaches in the U.S. In addition, the approval enables the CTDI assisted visual
separation, which allows aircraft to continue visual approach even when visibility drops
below requirement, and Surface Area Movement Management (Hughes, 2008).
Another trial is Capstone program in Alaska. Alaska Capstone program was an early
demonstration of ADS-B capability. The reasons why Alaska was chosen as a demonstration
of the new technology were lack of radar coverage, harsh weather, and so on. According to
the information published by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health,
accident rates in Alaska were up to 400 percent above the national average (Federal Aviation
Administration, 2001). Phase I of Capstone program was in Yukon-Kuskokwim (Y-K) Delta.
Phase II extended to Southeast Alaska. The Capstone program enabled surveillance outside
radar coverage and increased onboard situation awareness. According to FAA accident
statistics, the Capstone program reduced the aircraft fatal accident rate by 45% (Federal
Aviation Administration, 2007a).
3.4 Future of ADS-B
The FAA breaks down the ADS-B implementation schedule into four segments. The first
segment (2006-2010) includes building ground stations as shown in Figure 3-2. These area
include TIS-B/FIS-B only coverage. Only Louisville, Philadelphia, the Gulf of Mexico,
Ontario will have ADS-B ground based transceivers (GBTs).
Figure 3-2: Segment I Coverage (Federal Aviation Administration, 2006)
Segment 2 (2009-2014) includes completing ground station coverage of the US in existing
SSR airspace. Aircraft equipage will increase up to 40%. Segment 2 also includes finalizing
the ADS-B Out definition. Segment 3 (2015-2020) includes 100% aircraft equipage of
ADS-B Out. The definition of ADS-B In will be finalized in Segment 3. Segment 4 includes
that legacy surveillance equipment such as SSR will be decommissioned. Applications of
ADS-B will be fully implemented (Federal Aviation Administration, 2006).
The FAA issued the notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) about ADS-B Out on October 5,
2007 (Federal Aviation Administration, 2007a) and accepted public comments until March 3,
2008. The NPRM proposed the performance requirement for avionics equipment. In the
NPRM, the FAA also proposed the mandate equipage of ADS-B Out by January 1, 2020.
3.5 Ground Infrastructure
To achieve the benefit of ADS-B, the deployment of ground infrastructure is essential. In
August 2007, FAA awarded a performance-based contract to a consortium led by ITT
Corporation. The contractor will install and maintain the ground equipment necessary to
provide ADS-B uplink and downlink to ATC. According to the FAA's schedule, all ground
infrastructures will be placed where current surveillance exists by end of fiscal year 2013.
3.6 Benefit
There are two types of operational benefit of ADS-B: the independent benefit that is
independent of other aircraft's equipage, Bi (t), and the dependent benefit that depends on
other aircraft's equipage, Bd (t). The benefit per aircraft per year can be described as follows:
Benefit/Aircraft (t) = Bi (t) + Bd (t)
3.6.1 Independent Benefits
The independent benefit, Bi(t) increases over time because more applications will be
developed. The following five applications are the applications of the independent benefit
type. These applications are based on the assumptions of ADS-B Out application by the FAA
(Federal Aviation Administration, 2007b). However, these applications do not include all
applications that the FAA is planning to implement.
a) More efficient en route conflict resolution
Improved accuracy and update rate of surveillance allows reduction in potential conflict
warning (8nm to 7nm). The benefit from the reduced conflict warnings is calculated as a
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product of the number of prevented warning, the percentage of warnings that are acted
upon, and the average cost of a prevented vector maneuver. The average cost of prevented
vector maneuver is estimated from the distance of maneuver, and average speed.
b) More efficient ATC-based merging and spacing due to improved surveillance
Increased ability of merging and spacing (M&S) enables Continuous Descent Approach
(CDA) in higher demand area. The benefit of CDA is calculated from average fuel saving.
c) More efficient en route metering to the arrival fix
The improved accuracy and update rate increases the capability of controller automation
called Traffic Management Advisor (TMA), which optimizes arrival flows into busy
airports. ADS-B can reduce the uncertainty of the meter fix arrival time. The reduced
meter fix uncertainty can lead to the increase of runway throughput.
d) More efficient ATC management of surface movement
The FAA is upgrading ASDE-3 to ASDE-X. ASDE-X can increase some surface
efficiency: 1) improved identification of aircraft within a queue, 2) improved ability to
perform conformance monitoring, 3) improved surface surveillance during heavy
precipitation, and 4) improved ATC confidence in surface surveillance date.
e) Optimal routing
ADS-B can provide radar-like separation in non-Radar Airspace. The radar-like separation
permits the flights of additional more efficient routes. As a result, the aircraft can reduce
the flight distance and flight hour.
3.6.2 Dependent Benefits
The second type of benefit is the benefit depending on %Equipage. The dependent benefit
can be described as the function of % equipage as follows:
Benefit/Aircraft (t) = Bi (t) + Bd (t)= Bi (t) + Bdmax X %Equipage(t)
The following two applications are the applications of dependent benefit type. These
applications are also based on the assumption by the FAA (FAA, 2007b), but do not include
all applications that the FAA is planning to implement.
a) More efficient separation en route
The radar-like separation in non-radar area can reduce the separation and increase sector
capacity. The FAA announces that the initial separation will be limited to selected altitudes,
but widens to most altitudes above 24000 feet after ADS-B Out equipage increases.
Therefore, the benefit from the more efficient separation depends on % equipage.
b) Optimal routing
The optimal routing can lead to the increased capacity. The benefit from increased
capacity depends on other aircraft's equipage. The capacity will not increase when only
small number of aircraft adopt. When more aircraft adopt, the capacity increases more.
Therefore, this application depends on % equipage.
3.6.3 Assumption for Value of Benefit
The FAA calculated the benefits of each application of ADS-B and the result is published on
the FAA's website (Federal Aviation Administration, 2007b). The methodology that the FAA
used to estimate the benefits is based on the "Economic Value for Evaluation of Federal
Aviation Administration Investment and Regulatory Programs". Economic value is derived
from reduced flight hours. The economic value of reduced flight hours is quantified in terms
of the aircraft direct operating cost (ADOC) and the Passenger Value of Time (PVT). Direct
operating cost is fuel, crew and maintenance. PVT per aircraft type is based on average
number of seats and average load factors. The average economic value of ADOC and PVT is
shown in Table 3-1.
Table 3-1: Assumption of Economic Value (Federal Aviation Administration, 2007b)
Figure 3-3 shows the equipage curve that FAA
benefit estimation.
and ARC used as the assumption for the
ADOC -airborne (per hour) $2814
ADOC -ground (per hour) $1411
ADOC -block(per hour) $2596
ADOC -Average(per hour) $2274
PVT (per hour) $28.60
PVT (per aircraft-hour) $1966
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Figure 3-3: Assumption of Equipage Curve (Federal Aviation Administration, 2007b)
The FAA calculated the present value as of 2007 of the benefit of each application from 2007
through 2035. This benefit includes ADOC, which is the benefit for aircraft operators, and
PVT, which is the benefit for passengers. The present value of the benefit for airlines is
estimated by subtracting PVT. Table 3-2 also shows the first year when the benefit will be
realized.
Table 3-2: Assumption of Benefit and First Year Benefit Realized (ADS-B Aviation
Rulemaking Committee, 2007)
Application Benefit for airlines First Year benefit
(PV $Million) realized
More efficient en route conflict resolution $433.0 2017
Increased ability to allow CDAs $429.8 2014
More efficient en route metering to the arrival fix $225.2 2020
More efficient ATC management of surface movement $14.5 2016
Increased capacity $247.9 2011
Optimal routing $46.7 2011
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Using the above information, the independent benefit per aircraft per year and the dependent
benefit per aircraft per year can be calculated. Figure 3-4 and Figure 3-5 shows the
Independent Benefit per aircraft per year and Dependent Benefit per aircraft per year
respectively.
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Figure 3-4: Independent Benefit per Aircraft per Year
(note) Estimated from the FAA assumption for the benefit of ADS-B Out
Figure 3-5: Dependent Benefit per Aircraft per Year
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3.7 Cost
For an aircraft operator, the unit cost of acquisition of ADS-B Out is mainly composed of
GPS, augmentation, and transponder. Because older aircraft are not equipped with GPS, the
acquisition cost of ADS-B is high. On the other hand, because new aircraft are already
equipped with GPS, the acquisition cost is less expensive. Furthermore, when aircraft are
already equipped with upgradable transponder, the cost is much less expensive.
Therefore, the cost of adoption of ADS-B Out varies based on aircraft age. Aircraft can be
divided into 3 types based on aircraft age. This categorization is estimated from the
assumption used by the FAA (Federal Aviation Administration, 2008). Type A is the oldest
aircraft group, which does not have GPS or Transponder. Type B is the middle age aircraft
group, which has GPS and upgradable transponder. Type C is the newest aircraft type. The
unit cost of Type A includes the GPS with augmentation and transponder. The unit cost of
Type B includes the augmentation and transponder upgrade. The unit cost of Type C includes
the augmentation upgrade. Aircraft of Type A was delivered between 1983 and 1998. Aircraft
of Type B was delivered between 1998 and 2008. Aircraft of Type C will be delivered after
2008.
Table 3-3: Aircraft Type by Aircraft Age (Federal Aviation Administration, 2008)
Type A Type B Type C
GPS x O O0
Augmentation x x x
Transponder(DO-260A) x A(upgradable) O
Deliveries 1983-1998 1998-2008 2008-
Unit cost $150,000 $70,000 $32,000
The cost of acquisition of ADS-B Out also depends on the regular maintenance cycle. There
are several types of maintenance checks of aircraft. The light maintenance is done every
month or every a few months, and usually finished overnight. The heavy maintenance is done
every 4 or 5 years. Because the heavy maintenance check requires a lot of space and time, the
aircraft have to be out of service during the maintenance.
It takes some time to install ADS-B Out. Therefore, when aircraft adopt ADS-B Out outside
the heavy maintenance cycle, the aircraft must be taken out of operation. As a result, the cost
for the adoption of ADS-B Out becomes more expensive when aircraft adopt ADS-B Out
outside the heavy maintenance cycle. Therefore, the maintenance cycle is an important factor
for the decision about when aircraft operators adopt the ADS-B Out.
The other cost of implementation of ADS-B is the cost for FAA to deploy ground
infrastructure. On the other hand, maintenance cost for ADS-B will be less expensive than
that for the current radar-based surveillance system. ADS-B ground infrastructure does not
have moving parts while radar system has rotating antenna and additional system complexity
including calibrator.
Chapter 4 Modeling
This chapter describes the modeling of how aircraft operators make a decision about the
adoption of ADS-B Out and how the benefit of ADS-B Out changes. Aircraft operators adopt
ADS-B Out based on the benefits they can receive and the costs they have to pay. On the
other hand, the benefits of ADS-B Out depend on how many aircraft are equipped with
ADS-B Out. Benefits and equipage relate with each other and change dynamically.
The benefit of ADS-B Out has been calculated by FAA and ADS-B Aviation Rulemaking
Committee (ARC). This benefit is calculated based on the assumption of equipage curve.
However, the equipage curve changes as the benefit of ADS-B Out changes. Therefore, the
system dynamics model can be used to represent these complex dynamic changes.
4.1 System Dynamics Modeling
System dynamics modeling is a tool that enables understanding the structure of complex
systems where many factors relate with each other, to build computer simulations model of
complex systems, and to design more effective policies. System dynamics can be used for
both qualitative and quantitative analysis. (Sterman, 2000)
The feedback loop is a core concept of a system dynamics model. There are two types of
feedback loops: reinforcing (positive) loops and balancing (negative) loops. The reinforcing
loop is shown in Figure 4-1. When factor A increases, factor B also increases. When factor B
increases, factor A increases more. The behavior of each factor in reinforcing loop increases
or decreases exponentially. Reinforcing loop works as either virtuous circle or vicious circle.
ractorA, D
time
Structure Behavior
Figure 4-1: Reinforcing (Positive) Loop
Another feedback loop is a balancing (negative) loop. The balancing loop is shown in Figure
4-2. When factor C increases, factor D also increases. When factor D increases, factor C
decreases. The behavior of each factor in a balancing loop is goal-seeking. Whatever the
initial values of the factor C and D are, the factors reach to the equilibrium point.
Factor C,D
goal
time
Structure Behavior
Figure 4-2: Balancing (Negative) Loop
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4.2 Basic Model of ADS-B Out Equipage
This section describes the basic model of ADS-B Out equipage. Aircraft operators make a
decision about whether or not to adopt ADS-B Out and when to adopt ADS-B Out based on
benefits and costs. At the same time, in order to achieve the benefit of ADS-B Out, there are
three factors to be satisfied: ground infrastructure, applications, and aircraft equipage. Some
applications also require the equipage of other aircraft.
The model is mainly composed of two parts: Adoption Model and Benefit Model. The input
of the Benefit Model is the ground infrastructure, applications and % equipage, and the
output is the current and estimated future benefits. The input of the Adoption Model is
benefits and costs, and the output is % equipage.
+
Applications
Ground
llln tcrtsr UCfre
Figure 4-3: General Concept for Model of ADS-B Out Equipage
There is one reinforcing loop. When % equipage increases, benefits of ADS-B Out increase.
When benefits increase, more aircraft adopt ADS-B Out and % equipage increases more.
This reinforcing loop is the major driver of increase of the adopter of ADS-B Out.
Figure 4-4 shows the basic model of ADS-B adoption. The following section describes the
detail of the basic model.
Bdmax
dent
it (t)
Adoption Rate Independent
+ Benefit (t)
Attractiveness of /
Early Adoption Benefit (t) +
r
Figure 4-4: Basic Model of ADS-B Out Equipage
4.2.1 Adoption Model
As shown in Figure 4-4, all aircraft are divided into two stocks: Aircraft without ADS-B and
Aircraft with ADS-B. The equation for the number of aircraft with ADS-B, the number of
aircraft without ADS-B and the adoption rate in year t is:
# ofAircraft with ADS-B = f Adoption rate(t) dt;
# ofAircraft without ADS-B = Initial value - Adoption rate(t) dt, and
Adoption Rate = # ofAircraft without ADS-B x Fractional Adoption Rate.
The unit of Adoption Rate is aircraft/year, and the unit of Fractional Adoption Rate is 1/year.
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The attractiveness of early adoption is based on the differences between Net Present Value
(NPV) of early adoption and of future adoption.
NPV is a major criterion for the investment decision. When they make a decision about
investment, 75% of firms always or almost always calculate NPV (Franklin et al., 2006). As
NPV is the difference between the present value of the future benefits and costs, NPV can be
calculated as follows:
NPV = ICF(t) Benefit(t) Cost(t)
t = (I+ r) t ( l+r)' , ( + r)
Above, CF(t) is the cash flow at time t and r is the discount rate.
In general, when a project has positive NPV, companies are assumed to invest in the project.
However, a positive NPV does not mean that it is best undertaken now. It might be even more
valuable if undertaken in the future. Therefore, in order to invest a project now, there are two
conditions. One is that NPV should be positive, and the other is that NPV of current
investment should be larger than NPV of future investment.
However, because equipage of ADS-B Out will be mandate in the future, positive NPV is not
necessarily required for the adoption of ADS-B Out. The aircraft have to adopt ADS-B Out
sooner or later even if NPV is negative. A question for aircraft operators is when the optimal
timing of adoption is.
This System Dynamics model calculates NPV of early adoption and future adoption at each
unit time step and compares these NPV so that aircraft operators who have not yet adopted
ADS-B Out make a decision whether or not they adopt ADS-B Out at the time step.
When NPVk(t) is defined as NPV as of year t when aircraft adopt ADS-B Out k years later,
that is to say the adoption in year t+k, NPVk-(t) can be calculated as follows:
C B++ 1  Bt+k+2  4 B C R- B,+iN P Vk k+1 t k+ -2 ) R-, I(1+ r) + r) (l+r) 2  (l+r)R- (+ r) k (i=kl+ r)
Above, R is the aircraft retirement year. The aircraft can receive the benefit after adoption
ADS-B Out until the aircraft retires. Aircraft have to pay unit acquisition costs when aircraft
adopt.
Benefit/aircraft/year
A
Figure 4-5: Definition of NPVk(t)
In order to adopt in year t, NPV of adoption in year t should be larger than any NPV of future
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adoption between year t and the mandate date:
NPVo ( t) > N P V k ( t ) , (k = 1, 2 , - - ",T-t).
Above, T is the mandate date. Therefore, the difference between NPV of adoption in year t
and NPV of future adoption k years later should be positive:
B B B_ C k B C(1 + r) -C
NP V(t) -NP (t) = + )2  * C B~ CI(l+r)k >0.
I+r (1+r (1+r) (l+r) i -I (1+r) (1+r)
Benefit/aircraft/year
0 t t+l t+2
C(1+r)k-C
Figure 4-6: NPVo(t) - NPVk(t)
While the advantage of early adoption in year t, compared to adoption in year t+k, is to
receive the benefit between year t and t+k, the advantage to wait for the equipage until year
t+k is the differences between C and C/(1 + r)k . In other words, if aircraft operators wait for
the equipage until year t+k and invest the money (C) in another project or financial product
F
of the same risk until year t+k, the aircraft operator can receive C(1 + r) - C in year t+k.
This is the opportunity cost of early adoption. If the advantage of early adoption is larger than
the advantage to wait, the aircraft invest in year t.
For example, the difference between NPV of adoption in year t and adoption 2 years later can
be calculated as follows.
Cash flow of Investment in year t
Year t t+1 t+2 t+3 • * * R
Benefit Bt+l Bt+2  Bt+3  • * * BR
Cost -C
NPVo(t) -C +Bt+l/(l+r) +B t+2( I +r)2  +B t+3/(1+r) 3  . . . +BR/(I+r)R -t
Cash flow of Investment 2 years later (in year t+2)
Year t t+1 t+2 t+3 * * * R
Benefit Bt+3 " " " BR
Cost -C
NPV2(t) -C/(1 +r) 2  +B t+3/(l +r) 3  _ _ _ +BR/(1 +r)R-t
The difference between NPV of adoption in year t and adoption 2 years later is:
B1  B2 C
NP V (t) - NP V, (t) = I + - C+ C
I+(t)-NP r (I + r) 2  (+ r) 2
Attractiveness(t) can be defined as the minimum differences of NPVo(t) and NPVk(t) of any
future date until the mandate date:
Attractiveness(t) = min{ NPVo(t) - NPVk(t)}, (k = 1, 2,
Above, T is the mandate date.
S T-t).
Fractional Adoption Rate is a function of Attractiveness(t). Aircraft operators are assumed to
adopt ADS-B Out when Attractiveness(t) is larger than the minimum requirement of
attractiveness for early adoption. However, the minimum requirement of attractiveness for
adoption depends on the willingness of early adoption and is different according to aircraft
operators because the fleet configuration and operational pattern is different. The minimum
requirement of attractiveness for early adoption can be modeled as a normal distribution
centered around the average minimum requirement of attractiveness for adoption, A* with
standard deviation a . Below, A is Attractiveness(t):
Minimum required attractiveness 1 exp(- (A-A) 2
o-,2 20
2
The fractional adoption rate can be calculated as cumulative distribution function:
Fractional adoption rate= exp(- A )dA .JI"2r 20 2
Minimum required
Attractiveness for adoption
Fractional
Adoption Rate
A* Attractiveness, A Attractiveness, A
Figure 4-7: Definition of Fractional Adoption Rate
4.2.2 Benefit Model
As mentioned in section 3.6, there are two types of operational benefits: the independent
benefit that is independent of other aircraft's equipage, Bi (t), and the dependent benefit that
depends on other aircraft's equipage, Bd (0:
Benefit/Aircraft (t) = Bi (t) + Bd (t) Bi (t) + BdmLX X%Equipage(t).
The independent benefit, Bi (t) increases over time because more applications will be
developed. As described in section 3.6.3, the independent benefit increases as shown in
Figure 4-8.
Figure 4-8: Independent Benefit per Aircraft
In this model, Bi (t) is assumed to increase linearly over time. The equation of Bi (t) is:
18000
Bi(t) = 10 x (t- 2013) = 2571xt- 5175423 (t >2013)2020- 2013
Bi(t) = 0 (t < 2013).
From section 3.6.3, the equation of the benefit depending on other aircraft equipage, Bd(t) is:
Bd(t) - Bdmar X %Equipage(t) = 4000 X 0%Equipage(t) (t > 2011)
Bd(t) = 0 (t < 2011).
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The unit of Bi (t), Bd (t) is dollar per aircraft per year. The aircraft with ADS-B can receive
the benefit, Bi (t) + Bd (t), every year.
In order to calculate NPV in the Adoption Model, future benefits should be estimated. With
the above definition equation, Bi(t) can be calculated. Because the Bd (t) depends on %
equipage, future % equipage should be estimated first. The % equipage in mandate date
should be 100%. Therefore, the future % equipage between time t and the mandate date can
be estimated by linear interpolation. Then the future benefit between time t and the mandate
date can be calculated by using the estimated % equipage.
%Equipage Benefit
Bmax
fi t )
Bi
Estimated.**
mandate Time
Figure 4-9: Estimation of Future Benefit
4.3 Further Expansion of the Model
The basic model developed in section 4.2 can show the basic idea of the Adoption Model and
the Benefit Model. But it is too simple to represent the real ADS-B Out equipage. Three
factors should be added to the basic model. The first is the maintenance cycle of aircraft, the
second is the aircraft age, and the third is the deployment of ground infrastructure.
100
E(t)
Benefit
uipage
Bmax
Benefit (t)
0
I I
4.3.1 Cost and Maintenance Cycle
As mentioned in section 3.7, the acquisition cost of ADS-B Out depends on the regular
maintenance cycle. The cost for the adoption of ADS-B Out becomes more expensive when
aircraft adopt ADS-B Out outside the heavy maintenance cycle.
As mentioned in 4.2.1, adoption rate is determined by the comparison of the NPV between
the early adoption and the future adoption. The NPV varies according to the maintenance
cycle. Therefore, the adoption rate should be calculated separately based on the position of
aircraft in the maintenance cycle. Figure 4-10 shows the model that takes into account the
factor of the maintenance cycle.
Figure 4-10: Adoption Model by Maintenance Cycle
This model assumes that each aircraft receives a heavy maintenance visit every five years.
Therefore, the aircraft without ADS-B Out are divided into five stocks, each of which
represents the aircraft group of each position in the maintenance cycle: Aircraft that receive
the heavy maintenance this year, 1 year later, 2 years later, 3 years later and 4 years later.
Every year, aircraft move stocks from 4 years later to 3 years later, from 3 years later to 2
years later, from 2 years later to 1 year later, from 1 year later to this year, and from this year
to 4 years later.
Adoption rate for each stock is calculated separately.
a) Heavy maintenance in year t
When aircraft receives regular heavy maintenance in year t, the NPV of adoption in year t is
as follows:
B B1 BRNP Vo (t)=-C + ++' + ** +" r BR+r (l+r) (1+r)R'
NPV of future adoption (k years later) is as follows:
Future adoption in the future maintenance cycle
C Bi+k+1  Bt+k+2  BRNP = - +ý (t) +" -) +,(I + r)t) ( + r)k+l ( + rk+2  (1+ R-
Future adoption out of the maintenance cycle
C+ AC B+A+ 1  B+k+ BNP Vk (t)=- + + + *2 R
(I + r)k ( I + r)k+ (l+r)+2  (l+r)Rt
Above, AC is the additional cost when aircraft adopt ADS-B out of the maintenance cycle.
The differences of NPV between adoption in year t and the future adoption k years later are:
Future adoption in the future maintenance cycle
B, B B, C
NPVo (t) - NP V, (t) = +- + CNP r (l+r)2  (1 + r)k (l+r)
Future adoption k out of the maintenance cycle
B, B2 Bk C AC
NPV (t)- NPV, (t)= + --- C + ++
l+r (l+r)2  (1+r)k (l+r)k ( l+r)k
The attractiveness of the adoption in year t is the minimum differences between NPV of the
adoption in year t and the future adoption k years later. The differences between NPV of the
adoption in year t and the future adoption usually become the smallest when aircraft
operators compare the adoption in year t and the future adoption in the next maintenance
cycle.
b) No heavy maintenance in year t
When aircraft does not receive regular heavy maintenance in year t, the NPV of adoption in
year t is as follows:
NP Vo (t) = -C - AC + B +  +2 + BRl+r (l+r)2  (l+r)R- t
NPV of future adoption (k years later) is as follows:
Future adoption in the future maintenance cycle
NPVk (t) - C B+k + Bt+k+2 +. + BR
(1+ r) ( + r) +  (1 + r)k+2  (1+ r)
R-'
Future adoption out of the future maintenance cycle
C+AC B B,+ BRNP Vk (t) = - + t+k+l t+k+2 * B R(l+r)k •(lr)k±+1  (l+r)k+2  + r R-
The differences of NPV between adoption in year t and the future adoption (k years later) is:
Future adoption in the future maintenance cycle
B1  BZ Bk CNPVo (t) NP (t) = _--  + + k C+ -ACl+r (l+r)2  (+ r) (1 + r)
Future adoption out of the future maintenance cycle
B1  B 2  Bk CNP Vo (t) - NPVk (t) = + 2 +2 + C+- kNI+r (1+ r) (1 + r) (1+ r)
Basically, aircraft operators compare the NPV of the adoption in year t and the NPV of the
adoption in next maintenance cycle. When the benefit before the next maintenance is larger
than the opportunity cost and the additional cost of the adoption outside the maintenance
cycle, the aircraft operator adopts ADS-B Out this year with paying the additional cost rather
than waiting until the next maintenance cycle.
4.3.2 Cost and Aircraft Age
As mentioned in section 3.7, the cost of adoption of ADS-B Out varies based on aircraft age.
Therefore, the adoption rate should be calculated separately according aircraft age. In this
model, aircraft is divided into 3 types based on aircraft age as shown in Table 3-3.
Figure 4-11 shows the adoption model that takes into account the aircraft age and is
composed of 3 adoption models: adoption models for Type A, B and C. Type A is the oldest
aircraft, which do not have GPS or transponder. Type B is the middle age aircraft, which have
GPS and upgradable transponder. Type C is the newest aircraft. The adoption model of each
aircraft type represents the adoption model in Figure 4-10. The adoption rate of Type A, B
and C is calculated by using the unit cost of the aircraft of Type A, B and C respectively.
Figure 4-11: Adoption Model by Aircraft Age
This model assumes that all aircraft retire when 25 years old. Because the youngest aircraft
of Type A is 10 years old in 2008, all aircraft of Type A will retire in 15 years. Therefore, the
retirement rate of Type A is 1/15 of the number of aircraft of Type A. This model assumes
that the total number of aircraft does not change. The number of new purchased aircraft of
Type C for each year is the same as the number of retired aircraft of Type A.
4.3.3 Deployment of Ground Infrastructure
To achieve the benefit of ADS-B, ground infrastructure is required as well as aircraft
equipage. According to the current FAA's schedule, ground Infrastructure will be deployed
by the end of fiscal year 2013. Before 2013, ground infrastructure will be deployed by steps
geographically. This model assumes that ground infrastructure will be deployed in 4 steps by
2014. The first step of deployment of ground infrastructure is the location included in the
segment 1 as shown in Figure 3-2. During the segment 2, the FAA is planning to deploy the
ground infrastructure all over the NAS. The current schedule by ITT is shown in Figure 4-13.
The ITT plans to deploy the ground infrastructure all over the NAS in 3 steps between 2012
and 2014. According to the deployment schedule of ITT, the ground infrastructure will be
deployed from east to west based on the traffic density.
2012 20132013
2014
Figure 4-12: Deployment Schedule of ADS-B Ground Infrastructure (Hu, 2008)
When the deployment of ground infrastructure is taken into account, benefit per aircraft can
be defined as follows:
Benefit(t) = G(t) x (Bi (t) + Bd (1)).
When G(t) is the % operation exposed to ADS-B, Figure 4-13 shows the G(t).
% operation exposed to ADS-B
Segment 2
Segment I
2010 2012 2013 2014
Figure 4-13: Definition of G(t)
4.3.4 Summary of Assumptions
The following is the summary of the assumption of this model.
* The mandate date of ADS-B Out is 2020.
* The target of this model is 2008 to 2020.
* Bi(t) increases linearly over time.
* The heavy maintenance cycle is 5 years.
* All aircraft retire when 25 years old.
* Total number of aircraft does not change.
• Discount rate is 7%.
Year
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Chapter 5 Policy Analysis
This chapter describes the analysis of incentive policy for encouraging the early adoption of
ADS-B Out by using the System Dynamics Model developed in Chapter 4. The following
four policies are analyzed in this chapter: (1) Acceleration of Operational Benefit, (2)
Preferred Access, (3) Financial Incentives, and (4) Mandate Date.
5.1 Acceleration of Operational Benefits
The first policy for encouraging the early adoption of ADS-B Out is to accelerate the
operational benefit. This section focuses on accelerating the implementation of applications,
rather than developing new applications. Also, this section does not include the acceleration
of the benefits that are currently anticipated to be available after the mandate date. Because
most of those benefits require the full equipage of all aircraft, it is difficult to accelerate the
implementation of those applications before the mandate date. In this section, the mandate
date is fixed in 2020. The effect of moving forward the mandate date will be discussed in
section 5.4.
There are two types of operational benefits of ADS-B Out: the independent benefit that is
independent of other aircraft's equipage, Bi (t) and the dependent benefit that depends on
other aircraft's equipage, Bd (t):
Benefit/Aircraft (t) = Bi (t) + Bd (t)= Bi (t) + Bdmax X%Equipage(t).
Table 5-1 shows the anticipated accrual date for ADS-B Out benefits.
Table 5-1: Accrual Date for ADS-B Out Application (ADS-B Aviation Rulemaking
Committee, 2007)
Application Type Accrual date
More efficient en route conflict resolution 2017
Increased ability to allow CDAs 2014
More efficient en route metering to the arrival fix Independent 2020
More efficient ATC management of surface movement 2016
Optimal routing 2011
Increased capacity 2011
Dependent
Optimal routing 2011
Several applications of the independent benefit type are anticipated to gradually become
available between 2011 and 2020. On the other hand, the applications of the dependent
benefit type will become available in 2011. Therefore, this section focuses on the acceleration
of implementation of the application of the independent benefit type.
The independent benefit, Bi (t) increases over time because more applications will be
developed, and is assumed to increase linearly over time. There are two types of acceleration
of benefit as shown in Figure 5-1. One is the High Benefit Rate type and the other is the
Early Benefit type. The following section examines each type of acceleration of benefit.
Benefit/aircraft/year
year year
(a) High Benefit Rate Type (b) Early Benefit Type
Figure 5-1: Types of Acceleration of Benefit
5.1.1 Acceleration of Operational Benefits of High Benefit Rate Type
The first acceleration of the benefits is to accelerate benefit without changing the first year
benefit realized. In the baseline case, the benefits are available after 2014. Because the
ground infrastructure will be deployed all over the NAS in 2014, the applications in this
section are available only after ground infrastructure is deployed all over the NAS. Figure 5-2
shows the acceleration of the benefit of High Benefit Rate type. In the baseline case, the
benefit is zero until 2013 and reaches to the maximum benefit in 2020. In the 2-year
acceleration case, the benefit reaches to the maximum benefit in 2018. And in the 4-year
acceleration case, the benefit reaches the maximum benefit in 2016. In the 6-year
acceleration case, the benefit reaches the maximum benefit in 2016. The benefit never
exceeds the maximum benefit because the applications that are anticipated to be available
after 2020 are not accelerated.
Benefit/aircraft/year
Benefit/aircraft/year
Max benefi
Time (Year)
baseline I 1 - 4 years 3 3 3
2 years 2 2 2 6 years ---.--. ----- +-
Figure 5-2: Acceleration of Benefit (High Benefit Rate Type)
Figure 5-3 shows the change of the equipage curve. As the benefit is accelerated, the
equipage curve is also accelerated. For example, when the benefit is accelerated by 6 years,
the % equipage reaches 50% one year earlier than the baseline case.
Figure 5-3 also shows the different equipage curves of different types of aircraft. Type A is
the oldest type of aircraft and the acquisition cost is the most expensive. Type C is the
youngest and the acquisition cost is the least expensive. The aircraft of type A is affected the
most by acceleration of operational benefits. Type A aircraft requires higher benefits to adopt
the ADS-B because of the higher acquisition costs. In the baseline case, type A aircraft do not
begin adoption until 2015 while type B and type C aircraft begin adoption before 2014.
When the benefit is accelerated, Type A aircraft begin adoption earlier than the baseline case.
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Figure 5-3: Change of Equipage Curve by Acceleration of Benefit (High Benefit Rate
Type)
The total benefit per year is calculated as follows:
Total benefit (t) = benefit/aircraft (t) x # of aircraft equipped (t).
The total benefit per year increases as the operational benefit is accelerated.
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Figure 5-4: Change of Total Benefit by Acceleration of Benefit (High Benefit Rate Type)
The present value (PV) of the total benefit from 2008 to 2020 is the good indicator to show
the effect of incentives.
P 202 {totalbenefit(t)}
t=2oo008 (1 +0
The PV increases by $249 million when the benefit is accelerated by 6 years.
Table 5-2: PV of Total Benefit by Acceleration of Benefit (High Benefit Rate Type)
5.1.2 Acceleration of Operational Benefits of Early Benefit Type
The second acceleration is to move forward the first year when the benefit is realized by
keeping the slope constant. Figure 5-5 shows the acceleration by sliding the slope.
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Figure 5-5: Acceleration of Benefit (Early Benefit Type)
According to the current FAA's schedule, the ground infrastructure will be deployed all over
the NAS by 2014. When the implementation of applications is accelerated before 2013, it is
best to accelerate the deployment of ground infrastructure as well. However, because the
schedule of deployment of ground infrastructure is determined by the contract between the
FAA and the ITT Corporation, it is difficult to accelerate the schedule. The ground
infrastructure will be deployed in steps before 2013. When the applications are accelerated
before 2013, the benefit will be partially available only where ground infrastructure is placed.
Figure 5-6 shows the change of the Equipage curve when the benefit is accelerated. In
contrast to the acceleration of High Benefit Rate in 5.1.1, all types of aircraft are affected
almost equally.
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Figure 5-6: Change of Equipage Curve by Acceleration of Benefit (Early Benefit Type)
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The total benefit increases as the benefit is accelerated as shown in Figure 5-7.
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Figure 5-7: Change of Total Benefit by Acceleration of Benefit (Early Benefit Type)
Table 5-3 shows the PV of total benefit from 2008 to 2020 when the application is
accelerated by sliding the slope.
Table 5-3: PV of Total Benefit by Acceleration of Benefit (Early Benefit Type)
5.1.3 Comparison of Two Accelerations
The acceleration of Early Benefit Type is more effective than the acceleration of High
Benefit Rate Type. Although area A and B in Figure 5-8 is the same, the PV of total benefit of
the acceleration of Early Benefit Type by 3 years is larger than that of the acceleration of
High Benefit Type by 6 years.
Benefit/aircraft/Year
[$/aircraft/Year]
2010 2013 2014 2017 2020 year
Figure 5-8: Comparison of Two Types of Acceleration of Benefit
The reason why the acceleration of Early Benefit Type is more effective is the delay in
adoption. Even though the benefit increases sharply such as High Benefit Rate Type in Figure
5-8, the % equipage cannot increase so sharply because aircraft adopt ADS-B Out in their
maintenance cycle. An important thing is to begin adoption early. Therefore, Early Benefit
type is more effective than High Benefit Rate type. It is effective in encouraging the early
adoption of ADS-B Out to accelerate the implementation of some applications before ground
infrastructure will be deployed all over the NAS.
When the maintenance cycle is 3 years and 1 year, the change of the equipage curve is as
shown in Figure 5-9. The shorter the maintenance cycle is, the faster the % equipage
increases.
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Figure 5-9: Change of Equipage Curve by Shortening Maintenance Cycle
5.2 Preferred Access
The second policy is to give the preferred access to the aircraft equipped with ADS-B Out.
The benefit from preferred access decreases as %Equipage increases. The relation between
the benefit from preferred access and %Equipage is as shown in Figure 5-10. The early
adopter can receive the large benefit. When all aircraft are equipped, the benefit of preferred
access is zero.
Benefit/Aircraft/Year
Maximum benefit from
preferred access
100% %Equipage
Figure 5-10: Benefit from Preferred Access
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In order to analyze the effect of preferred access, the following two type of benefit from
preferred access are examined. The first type is the maximum benefit from preferred access is
half of the maximum independent benefit and starts from 2012. The other is the maximum
benefit is the same as the maximum independent benefit and starts from 2014.
Benefit/Aircraft/Year
Max Independent Benefit
0.5 Max Independent Benefit
2012 2014 2020 Year
Figure 5-11: Types of Benefit from Preferred Access
Figure 5-12 shows the change of the equipage curve when the benefit from the preferred
access is added to the baseline case. The benefit that starts from 2012 is more effective than
the benefit that starts from 2014 except for type A aircraft.
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Figure 5-12: Change of Equipage Curve by Preferred Access
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The total benefit per year is as shown in Figure 5-13.
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Figure 5-13: Change of Total Benefit by Preferred Access
5.3 Financial Incentives
The third policy is financial incentive. The government should be careful when considering
financial incentives because the incentives may distort the market mechanism. The financial
incentive makes deadweight loss and decreases the market efficiency. Figure 5-14 shows how
financial incentives create deadweight loss. When there are positive or negative externalities
that can not be captured by market mechanism, financial incentive by the government can be
justified. The examples of externalities are environmental externality, safety externality,
security externality, etc. (Viscusi et al., 2005)
q q-1
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Figure 5-14: Deadweight Loss by Financial Incentive
ADS-B has environmental benefits. ADS-B can reduce the flight hour of aircraft operators
and reduce the fuel consumption. While reduced fuel cost is the direct benefit for aircraft
operator, it is also an environmental benefit. ADS-B also increases the safety level of
operation. However, while increased safety is a benefit for passengers, the benefit from
increased safety is sometimes difficult to be captured.
Therefore, the financial incentive for the adoption of ADS-B can be justified by these
externalities. The level of financial incentive should be calculated from the value of
environmental externality and safety externality. While the estimation of the value for
externality is out of the scope of thesis, this section analyzes the effect of the financial
incentives on the equipage.
Three types of financial incentive in Figure 5-15 are examined. Aircraft receive the financial
incentive once when aircraft adopt ADS-B. Long&Low type incentive means that aircraft that
adopt before 2018 can receive the financial incentive as much as half of the acquisition cost
for type C aircraft, which is the youngest aircraft group. Short&Middle type incentive means
that aircraft that adopt before 2013 can receive the financial incentive as much as the
acquisition cost for type C aircraft. Short&High type incentive means that aircraft that adopt
before 2013 can receive the financial incentive as much as the acquisition cost for type B
aircraft, which is the middle age aircraft group.
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Figure 5-15: Types of Financial Incentives
Figure 5-16 shows the change of the Equipage curve. The financial incentives of
Short&Middle type are more effective in encouraging early adoption than that of Long&Low
type. When the period of financial incentives is the same, Short&High type is more effective
than Short&Middle type.
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by Financial Incentive
Figure 5-16 also shows the effects of financial incentive of each type aircraft. Type A is the
oldest and acquisition cost of ADS-B is the most expenses. Type C is the newest type of
aircraft and the acquisition cost is the least expensive. Type C is affected the most by the
financial incentive. For aircraft of Type C, the effect of Short&High type incentive is almost
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same as Short&Middle type. On the other hand, aircraft of Type A are affected only by the
Short&High type incentive, not by Long&Low type and Short&Middle type. While the
financial incentive of Short&Middle type is only 20% of the acquisition cost for Type A
aircraft, the Short&High type incentive is almost half of acquisition cost for Type A aircraft.
Therefore, the most effective way of financial incentive is to give Short&High type incentive
to type A aircraft, and Short&Middle type incentive to type C aircraft. However, if the
government gives different financial incentive to different aircraft based on aircraft age, this
approach may raise an equity issue.
The PV of total expense of FAA for financial incentives is shown in Table 5-4.
Table 5-4: Total Expense of FAA for Financial Incentive
5.4 Mandate Equipage
The last policy is mandate. Mandate is an efficient and assured way to increase the equipage.
The FAA announces that the current plan of mandate is 2020. This section analyzes the effect
of the changing mandate date.
When the mandate date is moved forward, the equipage curve changes as shown in Figure
5-17. When the mandate date is from 2014 to 2018, the equipage curves are almost parallel.
72
5-17. When the mandate date is from 2014 to 2018, the equipage curves are almost parallel.
Aircraft adopt ADS-B Out in the maintenance cycle just before the mandate date. Because
the maintenance cycle is 5 years in this model, aircraft begin to adopt ADS-B Out 5 years
before the mandate date. And about 20% of aircraft adopt each year. When the mandate date
is moved forward before 2013, aircraft have to adopt out of the maintenance cycle and
equipage curve increase more rapidly.
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Figure 5-17: Change of Equipage Curve by Changing Mandate Date
Figure 5-18 shows the relation between the mandate date and the NPV from 2008 through
2035. As the mandate date is moved forward, the PV of both cost and benefit increase. There
are several reasons for the increase of cost. The first reason is that the PV of cost for early
adoption is larger than that for late adoption because of time value of the cost. The second
reason is that when the mandate date is before 2013, aircraft have to adopt out of the
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maintenance cycle and acquisition cost increases. This is the reason why the cost increases
more rapidly when the mandate is before 2013. The last reason is that old aircraft have to
retrofit. When the mandate date is late, old aircraft will decrease because of retirement and
new aircraft increase. The unit cost of ADS-B for old aircraft is more expensive.
PV of total benefit also increases as the mandate date is moved forward. There are two
reasons. The first reason is that many aircraft adopt before the benefit is available. Therefore,
more aircraft can receive the benefit just after the benefit is realized. The other reason is that
the benefit depending on other aircraft's equipage increases because %Equipage increases
early.
When the mandate date is moved forward before 2013, the benefit becomes almost steady.
Because the independent benefit is available only after 2013, the benefit does not increase
even if mandate date is moved forward before 2013. On the other hand, the cost increases
rapidly when the mandate date is moved forward before 2013. Therefore, the NPV decreases
sharply when the mandate date is before 2013.
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Figure 5-18: NPV and Mandate Date
However, this optimal timing of the mandate equipage in Figure 5-18 is just an example
because this model is based on many assumptions. The first assumption is all aircraft take the
regular heavy maintenance every five years. When the regular heavy maintenance cycle is
three years, the optimal timing of the mandate equipage will change. The optimal timing of
the mandate equipage also depends on the assumption of the distribution of aircraft age.
This model includes the benefits and costs only for aircraft operators, and does not include
the benefits and costs for passengers and the FAA. When the benefits and costs for
passengers and the FAA are taken into consideration, the optimal timing of the mandate
equipage will change.
Furthermore, Figure 5-18 shows the change of the NPV when the mandate date is moved
forward and other conditions do not change. When the other incentive policies descried in
this thesis, such as acceleration of operational benefit, financial incentive, etc. is introduced,
the optimal timing will also change.
Chapter 6 Conclusion
There are several barriers to achieve successful transition from a current technology to a new
technology. This thesis analyzed how adoption of ADS-B can be encouraged by incentive
policies.
First, to understand how individual users adopt ADS-B Out, this thesis developed a system
dynamics model, which is mainly composed of two parts: Adoption Model and Benefit
Model. Each part relates to the other. Adoption of ADS-B depends on benefits, and the
benefits of ADS-B depend on how many aircraft are equipped with it.
Furthermore, the acquisition cost of ADS-B is different according to its position in the
maintenance cycle. When aircraft operators adopt ADS-B outside the regular maintenance
cycle, the cost becomes higher. Therefore, aircraft without ADS-B are divided into 5 stocks
based on position in the maintenance cycle, and the adoption rate is calculated separately.
The acquisition cost is also different according to aircraft age. Because old aircraft are not
equipped with GPS receivers, the acquisition cost becomes higher than the new aircraft that
is equipped with GPS receiver. Therefore, the aircraft without ADS-B are also divided into 3
stocks based on aircraft age.
Next, using this system dynamics model, this thesis analyzed the effects of the following four
incentive policies on adoption of ADS-B: (1) Acceleration of Operational Benefits, (2)
Preferred Access, (3) Financial Incentive, and (4) Mandate Equipage.
First, the result of policy analysis shows the acceleration of operational benefit is effective to
encourage the early adoption of ADS-B. Two types of acceleration of operational benefits
were examined: High Benefit Rate type and Early Benefit type. The acceleration of Early
Benefit type is more effective to encourage the early adoption than that of High Benefit Rate
type.
Second, preferred access is also effective as an incentive for early adoption because only
early adopters can receive the benefit of preferred access. As the adopters increase, the
benefits from preferred access decrease. Therefore, the preferred access is an effective policy
to encourage early adoption.
Third, the government has to be careful when financial incentives are introduced because
financial incentives create the dead-weight loss. Financial incentives can be justified by the
externalities such as environmental externality, safety externality, and so on. When the
financial incentives can be justified, financial incentives can encourage early adoption. When
financial incentives are given only to early adopters, the financial incentive becomes more
efficient. When the financial incentives are given to late adopter as well, the financial
incentive cannot be an incentive for early adoption.
Last, the mandate equipage is an effective way to increase adopters of ADS-B. Because some
benefits of ADS-B require the equipage of all aircraft, mandate equipage in the future is
reasonable. When the mandate date is moved forward, the present value of the benefit of
ADS-B increases as well as the cost increases. This thesis showed how the optimal timing of
mandate equipage is figured out.
Finally, it should be noted that the numbers used in this thesis, such as the value of benefits
and costs of ADS-B, optimal timing of the mandate equipage are just examples. The actual
costs and benefits are likely to be different. So care must be used in interpretation of the
result and further analysis should be conducted when more accurate cost and benefit
estimates are available.
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